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Beyond the Plan: Individual Responder and Family 
Preparedness in the Resilient Organization 
Mark Landahl and Cynthia Cox 
The level of preparedness and capability of government and private sector first-
response entities to react to disaster rests upon the assumption that the human 
element, essential employees, will be ready and able to carry out the functions 
that have been planned, the tasks they have been trained to perform, provided 
the necessary equipment to complete, and that proficiency has been 
demonstrated through exercise. The assumption that first responders will report 
is the foundation of the ability of organizations to maintain continuity and 
provide essential services to citizens affected by disaster. This raises the question: 
how solid is our foundation for emergency response in disasters? Studies 
reviewed in this article show that personal and family preparedness and safety 
are the predominant issues for first responders in their ability and willingness to 
report for assignment in a crisis. This raises another question: Are we doing 
enough to allay the concerns of first responders so that they will clock in at the 
time we need them most? 
This article provides an overview of employee and family preparedness and 
role of the employer in a resilient organization. Literature related to individual 
employee and family preparedness and the ability and willingness to report in 
emergency situations is reviewed as well as the adequacy of current DHS policy in 
addressing employee preparedness issues. In addition, the results of a survey of 
homeland security leaders on the issues of employee preparedness as it relates to 
response capability and organizational resilience will be presented. The overall 
goal of the paper is to examine the role of the employer in developing and 
maintaining employee and family preparedness and to identify the general 
elements of an effective preparedness program in a resilient organization. 
As we focus on the ability and willingness of first responders to report as a 
function of organizational capability it is necessary to define these terms.  Ability 
is defined as “whether an individual would be available and have the necessary 
means to report for duty.”1 The term willingness is defined as “whether an 
individual would report for duty or respond positively to a request to report for 
duty.”2 Current Department of Homeland Security (DHS) preparedness guidance 
through the National Preparedness Guidelines and capabilities-based planning 
tools (National Planning Scenarios, Universal Task List, and Target Capabilities 
List) define capability simply as “the means to accomplish the mission.”3 The 
guidance also describes a capability as consisting of the following elements: 
planning, organization and leadership, personnel, equipment and systems, 
training and exercises, evaluations, and corrective actions. Clearly, the 
availability of first-response personnel to report for assignment is a core element 
of capability. 
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RESPONDER ABILITY, WILLINGNESS TO REPORT AND THE 
FAMILY CONNECTION – PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
The example set in the wake of Hurricane Katrina illustrates the importance of 
employee preparedness in the ability of response organizations to carry out 
mission-essential functions. The New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) faced 
incredible odds in the response to the catastrophe and “lost almost all 
effectiveness.”4 There are a number of contributing factors identified in the 
various official reports that led to the collapse of NOPD; among these was the fact 
that “missing police officers led to a law enforcement manpower shortage.”5  
Although a percentage of officers were derelict in their duties, the vast majority 
either became victims themselves or were unable to report because of storm-
related personal crises. The U.S. Senate report on Hurricane Katrina estimates 
that 5 percent of the NOPD forces were stranded at home.6  The question is what 
preparedness activities taken by NOPD would have reduced the number of absent 
officers? 
This specific question has not been researched and is not the direct subject of 
this article, but informs its overall purpose. Although there is no direct research 
on this subject, there was a noticeable change in the preparation of employees by 
NOPD during the 2008 hurricane season. In preparation for Hurricane Gustav, 
which was originally projected for a Katrina-style direct hit on New Orleans, the 
NOPD gave employees paid time off to prepare and evacuate their families before 
reporting for duty.7 Thankfully for New Orleans, but unfortunately for research 
on the effectiveness of the strategy, Hurricane Gustav gave only a glancing blow 
to New Orleans. The strategy shift by NOPD itself evidences the importance of 
prepared employees and families to the overall organizational capability of 
NOPD.  
The direct evidence provided by the strategic shift of the NOPD example is 
supported by several studies related to family issues and the ability and 
willingness of first responders to report for assignment. Three studies conducted 
at the Naval Postgraduate School Center for Homeland Defense and Security in 
three different first-response disciplines and two different geographic regions 
yield similar results. A study of police officers in the National Capital Region 
(NCR) by Nancy Demme (2007) revealed that family preparedness and safety 
were the determinant factors in the ability and willingness of police officers to 
report for assignment in a biological incident.8 A study of the ability and 
willingness of firefighters in the NCR to respond to a pandemic influenza 
outbreak by John Delaney (2008) yielded similar results. The study found that 
the “principal variables affecting fire fighters’ ability to participate in a pandemic 
centers around family.”9  A third study by Shelley Schechter (2007) on the ability 
and willingness of Medical Reserve Corps volunteers in Nassau County, NY to 
respond revealed that that one of the most significant barriers to the fulfillment 
of job requirements during a disaster is family responsibilities.10 
There have been other studies conducted in the first-response field, 
particularly in public health and healthcare, which reveal common concerns 
about family as an obstacle to reporting to work.  A study by Yaron Shapira and 
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others (1991) of the willingness of hospital personnel in Israel to report to work in 
response to an unconventional missile attack drew similar conclusions. The 
majority of respondents cited the need to care for their family as one of the 
reasons for their unwillingness to report.11  A study of healthcare workers at forty-
seven hospitals in New York City by Kristine Qureshi and others (2005) revealed 
that family issues impacted both the willingness (concern for family) and the 
ability (childcare, eldercare, and pet care) of hospital workers to report for duty.12 
A national study of Emergency Medical Technicians (EMT) by Charles DiMaggio 
and others (2005) revealed that “concern for family (44.3 percent) led the list of 
reasons respondents would not be willing to respond to a major bioterrorist, 
chemical, or nuclear disaster.”13 An unpublished study by Thomas Nestel (2005) 
of the ability and willingness of police officers in Philadelphia to respond using 
the fifteen National Planning Scenarios revealed that based on the given scenario 
55-66 percent of police officers reported they would refuse to adhere to an 
emergency recall or would consider abandoning their position based upon 
concerns for the safety of their family.14   
These studies indicate that family and personal preparedness issues are in the 
forefront of the minds of responders in their decision to report to work in 
emergencies. The questions revealed in seeking to understand how to counter 
this concern among first responders are: is the preparedness of individual first 
responders and their families in the forefront of the preparedness activities of 
first response organizations? Or are our efforts focused too heavily on 
preparedness of personnel to perform a tactical response mission (response 
training, equipment acquisition, and response exercises) that they may not report 
to complete? 
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY PREPAREDNESS 
GUIDANCE AND EMPLOYEE AND FAMILY PREPAREDNESS 
As discussed in the opening paragraph, current DHS guidance developed under 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8 (HSPD-8): National Preparedness 
measures preparedness in terms of the capability to prevent, protect, respond to, 
and recover from all-hazards disasters. Capability is defined by the National 
Preparedness Guidelines as “the means to accomplish the mission.”15 The 
capabilities-based planning toolbox (National Planning Scenarios, Universal 
Task List, and Target Capabilities List) defines thirty-seven core capabilities 
described in the TCL that outline the range of necessary actions to prevent, 
protect, respond to, and recover from all-hazards emergencies. The question is 
what guidance does the capabilities-based planning process provide for employee 
and family preparedness? 
Of the thirty-seven capabilities, none deal directly with the individual and 
family preparedness of responders. In the TCL each of the thirty-seven 
capabilities is defined, the expected outcome is stated, and performance tasks 
and measures/metrics for capability achievement are delineated. Although the 
individual preparedness of responders and families are not specifically grouped 
into a single capability there are several associated capabilities that contain 
LANDAHL & COX, BEYOND THE PLAN 
 
 
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME V, NO. 3 (SEPTEMBER 2009) WWW.HSAJ.ORG  
 
4 
elements necessary for achieving employee and family preparedness. The three 
most closely associated capabilities are Community Preparedness and 
Participation, Responder Safety and Health, and Mass Care (Sheltering, Feeding, 
and Related Services). The expected outcomes for each of these capabilities are 
described below in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Capability Outcomes16 
Capability Outcome 
Community Preparedness and Participation 
There is a structure and a process for ongoing 
collaboration between government and 
nongovernmental resources at all levels; volunteers 
and nongovernmental resources are incorporated in 
plans and exercises; the public is educated and 
trained in the four mission areas of preparedness; 
citizens participate in volunteer programs and 
provide surge capacity support; nongovernmental 
resources are managed effectively in disasters; and 
there is a process to evaluate progress. 
Responder Safety and Health No illnesses or injury to any first responder, first 
receiver, medical facility staff member, or other 
skilled support personnel as a result of preventable 
exposure to secondary trauma, 
chemical/radiological release, infectious disease, or 
physical and emotional stress after the initial 
incident or during decontamination and incident 
follow-up. 
Mass Care (Sheltering, Feeding, and 
Related Services) 
Mass care services, including sheltering, feeding, 
and bulk distribution, are rapidly provided for the 
population and companion animals within the 
affected area 
 
The outcome and activities described for each capability outlined in Table 1 do 
not delineate special considerations or guidance that impacts first responder 
ability and willingness to report for assignment. Several of the capabilities do, 
however, begin to address some of the underlying conditions. Are these disparate 
elements sufficient to ensure that first responders will leave their families and 
report for assignment in challenging conditions? This is a critical issue as all of 
the response capabilities outlined by the TCL rest on the assumption that 
personnel required to perform these tasks will report for assignment.  
The Community Preparedness and Participation capability is the most closely 
associated capability as it seeks a populace educated and trained in the four 
preparedness mission areas. Training is an essential element in preparedness. 
The training of the general populace, however, has fewer requirements than those 
needed for first-response personnel and their families who need more than to 
simply avoid becoming victims and maintaining basic necessities; they must be 
able to report for assignment in dire conditions. One of the planning assumptions 
in the TCL description for this capability is “professional responders and 
volunteers may get ill or fail to participate as expected due to fear of getting sick, 
or perceived greater need to care for their own families.”17 Although it is assumed 
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in the TCL that responders and volunteers may have a perceived greater need to 
care for their families, there is nothing described within this capability to counter 
or attempt to minimize the impact of family concerns on the ability and 
willingness of responders to report. This is a critical element of our overall 
preparedness, identified as a planning assumption, but any method for 
potentially mitigating the problem is absent from the guidance. 
The Responder Safety and Health capability seeks an outcome where the 
responder does not become the victim of any secondary injury or exposure. This 
outcome and associated activities, including ensuring appropriate personal 
protective equipment, monitoring post-incident health, etc., addresses some of 
the underlying concerns of responders who fear that exposure to hazardous 
and/or contagious substances at work may be spread to families. Responders 
who are properly trained, equipped and exercised under this capability may be 
more willing to report for assignment, but the capability does not address many 
of the issues tied to the ability of responders to report.   
The Mass Care Capability strives to provide shelter, food, and bulk distribution 
for populations and companion animals within an area affected by disaster. 
Although not specifically delineated among the previously identified research, it 
is a reasonable conclusion that the individual safety and access to adequate food 
and shelter for family members would be a concern of first responders. Similar to 
the Community Preparedness and Participation capability, planning assumptions 
are identified that show understanding of the concerns of first responders. The 
planning assumptions state: “As a result of the incident, many local emergency 
personnel – paid and volunteer – that normally respond to disasters may be 
dead, injured, involved with family concerns, or otherwise unable to reach their 
assigned posts.”18 Of elements outlined in the assumption about first responders, 
death, injury, family concerns or inability to reach assigned posts, only family 
concerns can be mitigated. The TCL falls short in providing guidance in 
addressing the family concerns of responders. In fairness, “family concerns” 
could be construed to include a wide variety of issues that could include anything 
from the death of a family member in the disaster to simply needing food and 
shelter for family members. The latter is more simply achieved, while the former 
is impossible to address in an effort to encourage responders to report.   
There is a clear disconnect between what responders describe as issues 
affecting their ability and willingness to report and preparedness guidance that 
does not begin to address the issue. The TCL does not adequately address the 
underlying conditions that are necessary for successful disaster response: the 
ability and willingness of employees to report for tactical assignment. Overall 
these capability outcomes describe several elements of what could be pulled 
together to define a First Responder and Family Care and Preparedness 
Capability. Can the issue of first responder and family preparedness be 
adequately addressed through modification of the critical tasks and outcomes of 
the three identified capabilities in the current guidance, or does a specific 
capability need to be developed? Are we truly prepared if we have not addressed 
the conditions that may cause our responders to fail to report or abandon posts in 
a disaster? The guidance recognizes these as planning assumptions, but what do 
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we do about them? In this case the preparedness guidance falls short of getting to 
actual preparedness.  
EMPLOYEE AND FAMILY PREPAREDNESS: A SURVEY OF 
HOMELAND SECURITY LEADERS 
A survey of graduates and current participants in the Naval Postgraduate School’s 
Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS) master’s degree and 
executive leaders programs was conducted to gather information and opinions 
concerning employee preparedness and its role in organizational preparedness 
and resilience The purpose of the survey was twofold. First, it provided an 
exploratory view of agencies’ efforts to prepare employees and families; e.g. the 
existence of written plans to support employees and families in disaster, and the 
content and frequency of training programs targeted at employee and family 
preparedness. With limited research in the area, gathering this information was 
an important first step. Second, the survey collected data concerning the opinions 
of homeland security leaders on the role of employers in building and sustaining 
employee and family preparedness. This was important in discerning the level of 
problem recognition among the group and its correlation to existing plans and 
training in agencies.  
The survey was conducted over the three-week period prior to the 2009 CHDS 
Annual Alumni Conference. A web link to the online survey was posted to CHDS 
discussion boards and distributed via broadcast emails to approximately 325 
former and present program participants. Participation in the survey was 
voluntary and concluded with ninety-seven respondents. This particular audience 
was chosen initially as a matter of practicality; with a limited time frame and 
resources to conduct a formal study, the Center provided access to a significant 
target audience. It also allowed the authors a quick and convenient means to 
survey senior homeland security officials, emergency management leaders, and 
responders across the spectrum of disciplines and geographic regions, as well as 
the opportunity to engage them in pre- and post-conference discussion forums on 
the topic of employee and family preparedness. CHDS program participants are 
generally not typically representative of the larger homeland security community 
individually or organizationally. Individually they have been exposed to a broader 
curriculum of study than the average homeland security professional through 
participation in the program. They also represent homeland security 
organizations that are generally more progressive, demonstrated by their 
commitment to sponsor employees through the CHDS program.   
Using an online survey tool, the questionnaire was composed of thirty-eight 
multiple choice questions in four core areas: 
• Participant and Organization Demographics   
• General Organizational Emergency Preparedness  
• The Organization and Employee and Family Emergency Preparedness 
• The Role of the Employer in Employee and Family Emergency 
Preparedness 
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Participant and Organization Demographics 
Participants in the survey represent the wide variety of disciplines in the 
homeland security community. Specifically, emergency management and 
homeland security (24.2 percent), law enforcement (22 percent), military, fire, 
public health and medical, in that order, were the largest individual groups 
represented, with a few responders from private industry, public administration, 
transportation, and education. Emergency medical services was listed as a 
specific discipline and surprisingly had few representatives (3.2 percent); 
however, the inclusion of medical and public health as a separate discipline, and 
dual-role positions such as firefighter/EMT, may account for more emergency 
medical responders participating than the survey indicates. 
The majority of survey participants hold senior management positions in their 
agencies (51.6 percent), followed by mid-management (25.3 percent), with the 
remainder filling various agency roles including supervisors, staff, responders, 
and others. The number of respondents in senior leadership positions is 
significant since these are the decision makers who are typically responsible for 
agency policy, strategic planning, and new program development. These 
individuals also control organizational resources that can be applied to solving 
recognized problems.  
The majority of organizations represented included federal (32.6 percent), 
state (24.2 percent), and local (29.5 percent) government agencies, with 5,000 or 
more employees (37.9 percent) being the most common. Most organizations are 
in communities with populations over 750,000 (76.8 percent) and 50.5 percent 
had three or more local, state, or federal disaster declarations in the past five 
years. 
General Organizational Emergency Preparedness 
Participants were asked about the general emergency preparedness training and 
education provided by their organizations. Participants reported these courses 
are provided by FEMA, state and local homeland security agencies, the 
organization itself, or others that focus on the response and actions of the 
organization and the individual as a part of a team during emergencies.  In 
addition, participants reported:     
• 65.9 percent of organizations provide general emergency preparedness 
training and education opportunities for employees. 
• 55 percent of organizations require employees to attend general 
emergency preparedness training. 
• 74.6 percent of organizations do not offer any type of incentives for 
attending general emergency preparedness training. 
• 52.5 percent of the survey participants felt that incentives would increase 
employee participation in emergency preparedness education and training 
in their organization. 
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• 43.3 percent report that general emergency preparedness training is 
offered at least annually by their organization, most often during regular 
in-service activities. 
• General preparedness training and education is presented using a variety 
methods including online courses, onsite courses, self study and in-service 
training opportunities, and various formats including web-based and/or 
face-to-face instruction, video, and print materials. 
• Coordination of general emergency preparedness training is usually an 
additional duty of a regular staff member (54.1 percent). Less than half 
(45.9 percent) reported having a dedicated full-time staff member to 
coordinate general emergency preparedness training. 
Organizations and Employee and Family Emergency Preparedness 
Participants were asked about their organizations and the existence of policies, 
plans, and education and training related to employee and family emergency 
preparedness.  Participants reported:     
• 46.8 percent of organizations have written plans or policies in place to 
support employees only (food, shelter) during large-scale disaster 
operations. 
• 29.2 percent of organizations have written plans or policies in place to 
support employee families (food, shelter) during a large-scale disaster. 
• 29.1 percent of organizations provide training and education for employee 
and family preparedness. 
• Of those that do offer family emergency preparedness training, 85.3 
percent report that participation is voluntary. 
• 70.3 percent of the organizations do not offer opportunities for employee 
or family members to attend emergency preparedness training or 
education events hosted by the organization. 
The Employer’s Role in Employee and Family Emergency 
Preparedness 
Survey participants were asked to give their opinions regarding the role of the 
employer in employee and family preparedness and the relation of employee and 
family preparedness to organization resilience during large scale emergencies. 
Ninety-seven percent of respondents agreed that employee and family 
preparedness is an essential element in organizational resilience during large-
scale emergencies. 
Participants were also asked their opinion on the role of the employer in 
employee and family preparedness based on a progressive four-option scale of 
organizational responsibility. The scale proceeded from (1) no obligation to 
employee and family preparedness, to (2) encouraging employee and family 
preparedness by providing the opportunity through education and training, (3) 
mandating training, and concluded with (4) mandating training and the inclusion 
of personal and family preparedness through performance evaluations (where 
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allowed by law and/or negotiated labor agreement). The results to this question 
are shown below as percentage of the all respondents (totaling 100 percent).  
 
(1)  1.2 percent agreed that employer has no obligation to employees and 
families in their personal preparedness. 
(2) 52.9 percent agreed the employer should encourage employee 
preparedness by providing the opportunity for education and training in 
personal and family preparedness. 
(3) 20.0 percent agreed that the employer should require employee 
preparedness by providing mandatory education and training in personal 
and family preparedness. 
(4) 25.9 percent agreed that the employer should provide mandatory 
education and training to employees, and encourage family and personal 
preparedness through inclusion in performance evaluations or incentives. 
Additionally, participants were asked to select the statement that best described 
their opinion on the role of the employer in relation to essential employees and 
their families during the response phase of a large-scale emergency based again 
on a progressive four-option scale of organizational responsibility. The scale 
proceeded from (1) no additional responsibility for the employer, to (2) employer 
responsibility ends at encouraging employee and family preparedness by 
providing the opportunity through pre-emergency education and training, (3) the 
employer should be prepared to assume some responsibility for the care of 
essential employees only, and concluded with (4) the employer should be 
prepared to assume some responsibility for the care of essential employees and 
their families.      
(1) 3.3 percent felt the employer has no additional responsibilities to essential 
employees and their families during the response phase to large-scale 
emergencies. 
(2) 22.4 percent believed employer responsibility ends at encouraging 
preparedness and providing pre-emergency training and resources for 
personal and family preparedness. 
(3) 22.4 percent felt the employer should be prepared to assume some 
responsibility for the care of essential employees only during large-scale 
emergency response and recovery operations to include provision of food 
and shelter. 
(4) 52.9 percent responded the employer should be prepared to assume some 
responsibility for the care of essential employees and their families during 
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The survey results provide a snapshot of organizational activities and attitudes 
and opinions of homeland security leaders on the topic of employee and family 
emergency preparedness. While the survey was not designed to illustrate causal 
relationships, it provides needed baseline information about a topic where little 
exists. The key takeaway from the survey is that homeland security leaders 
generally (97 percent) recognize that employee and family preparedness is an 
essential element to organizational resilience during large-scale emergencies and 
a majority (52.9 percent) report that the organization should be prepared to 
assume some responsibility for the care of essential employees and their families.  
According to survey data there is a fundamental disconnect between problem 
recognition by homeland security leaders and organizational activities; only 29 
percent of participants reported their organizations had conducted training in or 
had written plans to support employees and families during disaster.   
The data also reveals an interesting paradox in how to address the issue. The 
majority (52.9 percent) reported that the employer responsibility ends at 
encouraging employee preparedness by providing the opportunity for education 
and training in personal and family preparedness. If, as the survey data suggests, 
employee and family preparedness is central to organizational capability and 
preparedness, can organizations afford to simply encourage?    
EMPLOYEE AND FAMILY PREPAREDNESS AND THE RESILIENT 
ORGANIZATION: RECOMMENDED PRACTICES 
The reviewed research indicates that individual and family preparedness and the 
ability and willingness of responders is a significant issue in the decision of 
responders to report for duty in disasters. The collected survey data shows that 
the problem is understood by leaders in the field of homeland security as 97 
percent agree that employee and family preparedness is an essential element to 
organizational resilience during large-scale emergencies and 52.9 percent of 
respondents indicated that organizations should be prepared to assume some 
responsibility for the care of essential employees and their families during large-
scale response and recovery operations to include food and shelter. The problem 
is that only 29 percent of the respondents reported their organizations had 
written plans to support the families of responders. This may be attributed to the 
lack of policy guidance in current DHS preparedness policy, a focus on 
prevention and response capabilities, or a lack of organizational resources 
directed toward the problem. The problem is clear; the solutions are not as easily 
defined.   
This article will fall short of delineating a definitive set of “best practices,” as it 
is the opinion of the authors that further research is necessary. This section is 
presented in an effort to stimulate a critical discussion that will lead to the 
development of true best practices for responder and family preparedness. There 
may be significant differences in how to approach the problem based on response 
discipline, geographic region, and/or local threat profile. Although there are still 
many unknowns in fully addressing this issue, it is prudent to present 
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consolidated recommendations from reviewed studies to begin the discussion on 
the development of best practices.   
In several of the reviewed research studies the authors provide recommended 
actions for enhancements that would result in greater reporting rates for 
responders. The studies suggest actions that are broadly focused on the full 
spectrum of issues that influence responder ability and willingness to report. This 
article reviews and evaluates only recommendations pertinent to individual 
responder and family preparedness. In addition to recommendations from 
previous research, the problem was also examined and suggested courses of 
action evaluated in a focus group convened as a breakout session of the 2009 
Naval Postgraduate School Center for Homeland Defense and Security Alumni 
Conference. The results constitute the initial salvo in a continuing effort to define 
“best practices” for organizations to increase responder and family preparedness. 
The studies and events examined in this article propose a set of 
recommendations that, if implemented, may assist in increasing the report rate of 
first-response personnel in disasters. It is likely that there may be differences in 
application of solutions to the problem in different responder disciplines and 
geographic regions based upon the community threat profile. Further research is 
necessary in this area. As response agencies examine the results and 
recommendations of these studies they should consider conducting their own 
research of the attitudes and preparedness characteristics of their personnel. The 
recommendations will be divided into pre-incident and response-phase activities 
and examined across three levels of organizational responsibility for responder 
and family preparedness that will be explored in the following section. 
DETERMINING THE LEVEL OF ORGANIZATIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR RESPONDER AND FAMILY PREPAREDNESS 
The several studies reviewed indicate there is a potentially serious problem with 
first responders reporting for assignment in the event of disaster. There is no 
“magic bullet”; this is a multi-faceted problem that has several overlapping and 
underlying issues that, if even partially addressed, may increase responder 
reporting rates. Examining policy recommendations from the many studies can 
be combined to form the basis of a strategic approach to problem mitigation.  
There is a critical two-part policy question that agencies and/or first response 
communities (cities, counties, and states, hereafter referred to as organizations) 
need to address before engaging options for mitigation. The critical question is: 
what level of commitment does the organization want to make to involvement in 
the personal and family preparedness of its responders (1) pre-incident and (2) 
during the response? In the survey of CHDS program participants these two 
questions were posed to solicit opinions on how agencies should be involved in 
each of these based on progressive scales. These scales can also be utilized to 
delineate options for organizations in determining their expected level of 
involvement in individual responder and family preparedness. The scale for the 
pre-incident role of the employer is detailed below in table 2.  
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Table 2: Options for the Pre-incident Role of the Employer in Responder and Family 
Preparedness 
Level of Organizational  
Responsibility Description 
None 
The employer has no obligation to employees 
and families in their personal preparedness. 
Low 
The employer should encourage employee 
preparedness by providing the opportunity for 
education and training in personal and family 
preparedness. 
Moderate 
The employer should require employee 
preparedness by providing mandatory education 
and training in personal and family 
preparedness. 
High 
The employer should provide mandatory 
education and training to employees, and 
encourage personal and family preparedness 
through inclusion in performance evaluations or 
incentives. (where not limited by state/local law 
or negotiated agreement) 
 
The research indicates that the option for employers to have no responsibility in 
the pre-incident preparedness of responders and their families is ill-advised. 
Selecting a low, moderate, or high level of organizational involvement in 
developing employee and family preparedness may depend on the risk-tolerance, 
resources, and/or community/organizational relationship with employees. The 
policy decision on the level of organizational involvement is critical in evaluating 
the applicability of pre-incident recommended actions that follow.    
 
Table 3: Options for the Role of the Employer in Responder and Family Preparedness 
during the Response to Disaster 
Level of Organizational  
Responsibility Description 
None 
The employer has no additional responsibilities to 
essential employees and their families during the 
response phase to large-scale emergencies. 
Low 
The employer responsibility ends at encouraging 
preparedness and providing pre-emergency training and 
resources in personal and family preparedness. 
Moderate 
The employer should be prepared to assume some 
responsibility for the care of essential employees only 
during large-scale emergency response and recovery 
operations to include food and shelter. 
High 
The employer should be prepared to assume some 
responsibility for the care of essential employees and 
their families during large-scale response and recovery 
operations to include food and shelter. 
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The answer to the second part of the policy question concerning the level of 
organizational responsibility for employees and families during the response to 
large-scale emergencies (Table 3) is also a necessary first-step in examining 
options for implementation. A high degree of organizational responsibility in 
assuming some obligation for employees and families will require significant 
resources to undertake at a time when community resources are likely to be 
scarce. Again, based on the conclusions of the previous research it would be 
imprudent to dismiss organizational responsibility in the preparedness of 
responders and their families. Organizational resources may not allow for a high 
degree of commitment, but there are steps that can be taken to reduce the scope 
of the problem to a level of risk-tolerance appropriate for the organization.   
There is also a policy question of how to handle this problem across first 
response disciplines within a community. Should each response agency consider 
this problem in isolation? Or should this issue be handled across the response 
disciplines in a community at the municipal, county, regional, or state level? The 
governmental structure of the community, recognition of the problem by 
community and response discipline leaders, and community hazard profile may 
all contribute to determining the appropriate level and organizational 
responsibility for this issue within a community.    
RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON LEVEL OF ORGANIZATIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR EMPLOYEE AND FAMILY PREPAREDNESS 
In this section recommendations for policy and plans that organizations may 
implement to potentially mitigate the problem at various levels of organizational 
responsibility for employee and family preparedness will be explored. Several of 
the reviewed studies present recommendations related to organizational policy 
and planning for responders and families in two phases of incidents: the Pre-
incident and Incident Response phases of disasters. These recommendations and 
results of discussions from the 2009 CHDS Annual Alumni Conference will be 
examined.    
The study of Medical Reserve Corps volunteers by Schechter revealed that the 
assurance that their family would be cared for was identified as the most 
important factor in enabling them to respond.19 This conclusion is echoed by 
several of the other identified studies and forms the basis for getting people to 
report during disaster. There is both a pre-incident and incident response policy 
and planning component to this problem. The pre-incident policy and planning 
component will be discussed progressing from the low to moderate to high level 
of organizational responsibility. This level is defined by creating the framework 
and opportunity for employee and family preparedness without the organization 
assuming any burden during disaster response operations.  
As we continue to examine this topic we will proceed with the assumption that 
the notional organization discussed has taken basic preparedness steps 
consistent with current DHS preparedness guidance. This includes the existence 
of an all-hazards response plan consistent with the Comprehensive Planning 
Guide and the National Incident Management System, necessary training has 
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been conducted and required equipment has been obtained to ensure responders 
have the necessary skills and equipment to perform required capabilities, 
exercises have been performed and evaluated, and corrective actions have been 
implemented. Beginning with this assumption allows for a more focused 
discussion of the issue of responder and family preparedness. While it is 
unreasonable to believe that all agencies have fully implemented all aspects of 
DHS preparedness guidance, we can reasonable assume that the process has been 
engaged at some level by most agencies. Although some general preparedness 
elements will be highlighted, the intention is to move the discussion beyond 
general preparedness to identify elements to mitigate gaps between DHS 
preparedness guidance and the anticipated actions of responders identified in the 
research. 
Pre-Incident Phase: Recommendations for Responder and Family 
Preparedness 
The primary pre-incident policy issue is fostering an environment where personal 
and family preparedness becomes a cultural element of the organization. 
Although described in the planning assumptions of the planning target capability 
outlined in the TCL, a first critical step is ensuring response plans have been 
shared with affected personnel. Demme’s study of police officers in the NCR 
revealed that many of the respondents did not have knowledge of biological 
incident response plans they were expected to be involved in implementing.20 
This is a basic first policy step in developing the transparency that is necessary 
for responders at the lowest level to develop an understanding of the range of 
duties they will be tasked with in disaster situations. If emergency or alternative 
staffing plans have been developed, these must also be shared with responders. If 
we are asking responders to be prepared at home, they need to understand the 
full scope of their expected duties to determine the potential impact on their 
families. In addition to the study by Demme, this recommendation is also made 
by other studies including the 2005 study of healthcare workers by Qureshi and 
others.   
Once transparency is established through sharing plans, responders need to 
have the tools to successfully build their personal and family preparedness. This 
is developed through training. Most of the DHS-sponsored training is focused on 
management-level planning and tactical response knowledge, skills, and abilities 
for which local expertise does not exist in most communities. There is a gap in 
responder and family preparedness training that is not a DHS issue, but needs to 
be a locally developed and locally focused. The content should be driven by the 
organizational decision regarding the level of involvement in responder and 
family preparedness. Responders may not necessarily know to ask the question 
concerning the relationship between the organization and their families pre-
incident, as they are focused on the day-to-day issues of their positions; the 
organization has to recognize the findings of the research and relay to personnel, 
before the disaster, the expectations and anticipated relationship with responders 
and their families. This can be accomplished through delivering personal and 
family preparedness training tailored to the expectation of the organization. 
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DHS/FEMA through its independent study program the DHS Ready campaign 
and the American Red Cross through its personal and family preparedness 
materials, provide a baseline that can be adopted and modified to meet local 
needs.  
Communicating the organizational expectation, then providing the tools for 
responders and families to prepare is the next critical step. For organizations/ 
response disciplines that have annual training requirements, the greatest benefit 
to the organization can be realized at minimal cost provided that personal and 
family preparedness training is incorporated into mandated training 
requirements. Training is necessary to both “prepare practically and 
psychologically” for the response.21 The importance of training is supported by a 
study of preparedness training for public health nurses that found a 12 percent 
increase in their intentions to report for assignment after attending training.22  
At the moderate to high level of organization responsibility the involvement of 
families in organization preparedness efforts should also be considered. Both 
Demme and Delaney recommend engaging responder families early in the 
preparedness process. Delaney states “Involving families early in planning a 
response, educating the entire family, and encouraging families to develop a 
sheltering plan and stockpile supplies…will help to alleviate fire fighters’ 
concerns for their families’ wellbeing.”23 Engaging families in an honest 
conversation about expectations of responders and the relationship between the 
organization and families in disaster response operations is important to 
extending transparency. Involving families early in the process, sharing plans as 
appropriate, and extending preparedness training to families of responders are 
necessary steps toward problem mitigation.   
Another critical pre-incident policy issue – at all levels of organizational 
responsibility – is ensuring responders are equipped with appropriate Personal 
Protective Equipment (PPE). Many of the studies examined identify responder 
willingness to report is impacted by fears of their own personal safety and that of 
their family. Although we have previously identified an assumption about agency 
engagement of the capabilities-based planning process and introduced the 
Responder Safety and Health target capability, this issue of PPE is critically 
important; it has appeared as a finding and/or recommendation in several of the 
identified studies (Demme, Shapira, and Qureshi and others). Responders issued 
and comfortable with the use of PPE may be less apprehensive about their safety 
and the safety of their families, particularly in the response to biological-related 
incidents when the potential exists to transmit illness from responders to family 
members.   
Another recent study of hospital personnel in an avian influenza pandemic 
(not previously referenced) supports this conclusion. The study highlighted the 
“importance of providing adequate protection for the workforce may be very 
helpful in minimizing absenteeism.”24 The study of Israeli hospital workers by 
Shapira and others also supports this recommendation; 86 percent of 
respondents advised they would report for assignment if adequate safety 
measures were in place.25 Properly equipping responders for likely hazards is an 
essential step in reducing fears of the transmission of illness to family members. 
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The pre-incident organizational commitment at the low level of responsibility 
for responder and family preparedness ends at this point. The expectation has 
been communicated and the opportunity for training has been provided, but not 
mandated. The moderate level of organizational responsibility mandates 
responder and family preparedness training and utilizes other strategies to 
institutionalize pre-incident responder and family preparedness. These steps can 
include backing training with a focus on preparedness reinforced by managers 
and supervisors at the unit level. Unit-level preparedness can be developed and 
maintained through periodic review of emergency plans at staff meetings or roll-
call trainings that supervisors can then link to the family preparedness of their 
staff.   
The high level of organization responsibility extends pre-incident 
responsibility to include individual and family preparedness in employee 
performance evaluations. This recommendation was advanced by Qureshi and 
others in suggesting that the “presence of a workplace personal emergency plan 
should be noted on annual performance appraisals.”26 Performance appraisals 
communicate and reinforce agency policy and expectations of employees. A 
cultural shift to an emphasis on personal and family preparedness would be 
communicated and reinforced by utilizing the performance appraisal system.  
In this section recommended activities at the three levels of organizational 
responsibility for responder and family preparedness were examined. These 
include policy, equipment, training, and communications recommendations that 
require varying levels of organizational resources to implement. The 
recommendations form the basis of pre-incident activities that are necessary for 
success in the incident response phase.   
Response Phase: Recommendations for Responder and Family 
Preparedness 
In the response phase responder and family preparedness is an element of only 
the moderate and high levels of organizational responsibility. As we discuss 
recommendations for the response phase, elements will be examined that require 
planning and policy in the pre-incident phase. The flow of information between 
the phases makes it more appropriate to discuss these items as related to the 
response phase, although there will be many activities required in the pre-
incident phase to successfully implement the recommendations.      
The moderate level of organizational responsibility in the response phase is 
characterized by assuming some responsibility for the care of essential employees 
during disaster. At this level the organizational commitment for care does not 
broaden beyond the individual responder. The organizational responsibility for 
responders extends to providing basic food and shelter for responders, ensuring 
their ability to report and remain at work with proper rest and nutrition during a 
disaster. Achieving this goal requires pre-incident planning and additional 
resources during the response. In response operations under the Incident 
Command System (ICS) logistical support for responders including “food and 
hydration service, sleeping, sanitation and showers” are considered in on-site 
incident management.27 Local plans must determine and communicate to 
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responders the extent of logistical support during responder off-duty hours in 
local emergency situations. Responders must know if they are expected to return 
home following a shift or have the option to remain at work and be fed and 
sheltered until the next shift. Depending on the nature of the emergency, such as 
in the response to Hurricane Katrina, responders may have nowhere else to go. 
Demme outlined the need for shelter options in the response to biological agents, 
as responders may be “willing to report to work, but are not willing to return 
home after a tour of duty, out of fear of contaminating their family.”28 The 
organization needs to determine the extent of the support they will provide to 
responders, ensure that plans are developed that include necessary resources, 
and communicate those plans to responders and their families.     
The high level of organizational responsibility is characterized by the 
assumption by organizations of some responsibility for the care of essential 
employees and their families during large-scale response and recovery operations 
to include food and shelter. This statement is qualified by the term “some 
responsibility.” The statement will be interpreted to cover a range of 
recommendations that all demonstrate a high level of organizational 
responsibility, some requiring a larger commitment of organizational resources 
to accomplish. The recommendations will be examined starting with the least 
intensive options and move to options that require more resources.     
The studies by Delaney, Demme, Qureshi and others (2005), and Shechter 
each present several recommendations that vary with regards to the level of 
commitment of organizational resources. Delaney and Qureshi and others 
present similar network-based recommendations that vary only slightly and draw 
on resources in differing levels. Delaney recommends the development of 
department-level support networks that are “station-based and are led by the 
spouse of one of the members assigned to that station.”29 The goal would be to 
“develop a support network for all of the families assigned to that station or shift, 
so that in an emergency there is an established group that can assist or be called 
upon at anytime.”30 In this recommendation the need for family care is 
recognized, but the burden is shifted to a network of employees and families to 
provide assistance to one another. The organization is limited to supporting a 
position in each station, perhaps by stipend.  
Qureshi and others recommended “facilitating the formation of emergency 
childcare/eldercare pools, with staff scheduled in such a way that sharing these 
responsibilities are possible”31 The recommendations of Delaney and Qureshi and 
others represent the low end of organizational responsibility for responder and 
family preparedness in the response phase. In these recommendations the 
organization serves as a facilitator in the response phase to enable responders to 
care for one another with limited impact on the organizational resources.    
Action recommended by Demme and Schechter represent the next step in 
organization responsibility (moderate level) for responder and family 
preparedness that requires more resources. Demme recommends the 
development of a Family Support Unit (FSU) that would be “staffed with officers 
who no longer have a work assignment as a result of the bio-incident, such as, 
school resource officers, crossing guards, and court officers.”32 The FSU would 
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function to push needed support out to families, so that officers would remain at 
work and the families of those who choose to remain away for fear of spreading 
illness would have a mechanism for their families to be supported at home. 
Demme states that to “ensure that officers would remain at work, the government 
would have to demonstrate that the families would be taken care of (i.e., food, 
medical needs, etc).”33 The FSU puts more burden upon the organization than the 
model proposed by Delaney. The FSU would have to be supported by broad 
logistical capabilities to ensure access to the range of necessary commodities. The 
larger organizational commitment required for the FSU also likely ensures 
greater reliability and potential success.  
Schechter also recommended, but did not describe in detail, a support service 
program for the Medical Reserve Corps (MRC) that includes “planning for 
sheltering, ‘at-home’ support for dependents and pets and a plan for provision of 
protective measures for the families of volunteers.”34 The primary goal of the 
program is to ensure “that caring for the responder’s resource needs is the first 
priority of the organization and primary to the ability of the MRC member to 
perform any other community work.”35 Qureshi and others also provided 
recommendations at the moderate level of organizational responsibility in the 
healthcare facility making arrangements with “local veterinarians or animal 
shelters for emergency pet care”36   
The issue of companion animal care was raised in several studies and has been 
a broadly recognized issue in sheltering populations in the wake of Hurricane 
Katrina. In a 2006 study of hospital disaster staffing by David Cone and Bethany 
Cummings pet care ranked higher (33 percent) in “support needs that would 
enable respondents to stay at the hospital for prolonged periods if met” than both 
child care (30 percent) and adult/elder care (6 percent).37 This illustrates the 
importance of the demographic of the responders expected to be served by family 
programs. There could be a number of factors including the age, marital status, 
presence of child/elder care responsibilities, and geographic dispersion of 
employee residences that are critical for the organization to understand in 
designing programs. The recommendations of Demme, Schechter, and Qureshi 
and others represent the middle-ground of organizational responsibility for 
responder and family preparedness in the response phase.   
One recommendation proposed by Qureshi and others has already been 
examined (emergency child/elder care pools); however, their study provided two 
options. The second option presented in the study was “pre-planning for the 
formation of emergency childcare or eldercare centers that are either on or off-
site.”38 Although the study identified the first option as preferable, the second 
option provides an avenue to discuss the highest level of organizational 
responsibility during the response phase. The previous moderate options seek to 
push resources out to families, while this option pulls family members in and 
makes the organization fully responsible for their care.  
It would be reasonable to think that the likelihood of responders to report may 
increase if family members would be cared for and safe during their shift. The 
support for this strategy comes from the study of Philadelphia Police Officers by 
Nestel that indicated based on the fifteen scenarios between 72 and 81 percent of 
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officers indicated that shelters established for police officers families would 
encourage them to participate in the response.39 The study by Demme also found 
that officers “suggested that if there was some place they could drop their spouses 
and kids off where they would be safe, then they could freely go to work.”40 The 
establishment of shelters for the families of responders is both resource-intensive 
and potentially politically divisive. If shelters are established for the families of 
responders in an environment of scarce resources there could be political 
ramifications for providing care to the families of responders that may not be 
available to the general public. The issue is in need of further focused research. 
In this section recommended activities at the high level of organizational 
responsibility for responder and family preparedness were examined. The 
recommendations cover a range of activities from creating a framework for family 
support with the dedication of limited organizational resources to the complete 
care provided by the organization that requires the commitment of significant 
resources. There is obviously no ‘magic bullet’ to this problem and the only sure 
element is that continuing broad discussion of options and political issues must 
take place.   
SUMMARY 
The issue of responder and family preparedness is “just below the radar” in our 
national preparedness efforts. In reviewing several studies and determining the 
ability and willingness of responders to report for assignment in disaster a 
consistent theme emerges: families matter. The results point to a disconnect 
between the focus of national preparedness policy and the thoughts of responders 
when making the decision to report to work. The decision is not entirely based on 
having operational training, equipment to perform the tactical mission, and 
exercises to demonstrate proficiency, but also involves what is going to happen to 
family when responders walk out the door, or come back in after dealing with a 
disaster. The problem is multi-faceted and in need of further study and analysis. 
The issue has not been the direct subject of research, but appears as a consistent 
factor across response disciplines and geographic areas.   
In this article the issue was examined to include an analysis of options for 
mitigation presented in disparate studies. The options were examined as pre-
incident and incident-response phase activities that required varying levels of 
organizational responsibility for responder and family preparedness and care. 
The level of organizational responsibility ranged from the employer simply 
providing the opportunity for responders to prepare themselves through policy 
and training at the low level to a high-level organizational commitment requiring 
significant resources to push needed items to responder families or pull families 
in to organization-established shelters.  
As response organizations examine the results and recommendations of these 
studies they should consider conducting their own research of the attitudes and 
preparedness characteristics of their personnel. The key is organizational 
understanding of its employees, their demographics, and geographic dispersion. 
It is recommended that organizations undertake evidence-based studies before 
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considering the commitment of substantial resources to the preparedness of 
responders and potential care of their families during the response phase. There 
may be extreme differences in responder populations based on regional 
characteristics, response disciplines, and/or employee demographics that may 
radically shift recommended actions within a locality.          
In reviewing the research and DHS preparedness guidance it is obvious that 
the issue has not reached the stage of broad recognition. The role of the 
individual employee and family preparedness in overall organization 
preparedness and resilience may be the “soft underbelly” of post-9/11 
preparedness and response efforts. Perhaps, as was recognized by NOPD 
following Hurricane Katrina, we need a national strategic shift in our 
preparedness efforts to focus on the underlying conditions that impact the 
decision of first responders to report for assignment. 
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